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Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations After Shaffer v.
Heitner
INTRODUCTION

The scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction over alien corporations
is an unsettled question since the constitutional standards which
limit the assertion of such jurisdiction are currently changing., The
Supreme Court decision of Shaffer v. Heitner is the primary impetus behind the re-examination of the precepts underlying extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction. Shaffer held that mere attachment of property within a state is not necessarily a constitutionally
sufficient basis for jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.'
Shaffer extends the applicability of a minimum contacts analysis to
any extraterritorial assertion of state court jurisdiction, and therefore, establishes that jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
must be premised upon meaningful connections with the forum
state.'
Shaffer will have a significant effect upon the extraterritorial
exercise of jurisdiction over alien corporations. 5 Historically, the
type of jurisdiction exerted over such non-residents is often characterized as quasi-in-rem. Shaffer requires that such assertions of jurisdiction satisfy the minimum contacts criteria. 6 Undoubtedly application of this standard will curtail the permissible scope of jurisdiction over alien corporations which heretofore was predicated
largely upon attachment of domestic property.7 However, such a
standard should not necessarily eliminate the only available forum
for the plaintiff in the United States. Where an attachment proced1. "It is clear, therefore, that the law of state-court jurisdiction no longer stands securely
on the foundation established in Pennoyer." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,206 (1977).
2. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
3. See notes 34-44 infra and accompanying text.
4. "The Due Process Clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment . . . against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relations." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945),
cited in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,216 (1977).
5. Comment: Jurisdiction-Exerciseof In Rem and Quasi In Rem JurisdictionJustified
Only Where InternationalShoe Minimum Contacts Standard Is Satisfied, 11 VAND. J.
TRANSL. L. 159, 168-69 (1978).
6. "We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." 433 U.S. 186,
212 (1977).
7. "Thus, although the presence of the defendant's property in a State might suggest the
existence of other ties among the defendant, the state and the litigation, the presence of the
property alone would not support the State's jurisdiction." (emphasis added) Id. at 208-09.
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ing is the only means available for compelling the appearance of an
alien corporation in the United States, the applicable standard for
evaluating the constitutionality of the basis for jurisdiction should
reflect the unique policy considerations which are present.' Although Shaffer itself reserves this question,9 the jurisdictional analysis underlying the decision'0 serves as a guide for its resolution.
This article will attempt to reconcile the treatment of extraterritorial jurisdiction and alien corporations with the evolving constitutional standards in the area. A historical background to the
current constitutional standards will precede an analysis of
Shaffer's potential impact on such jurisdictional doctrines. This
note will discuss the problems involved in applying such doctrines
to alien corporations through an examination of the various methods for obtaining extraterritorial jurisdiction over them. Recommendations regarding the proper resolution of such difficulties will
then be proposed.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The principle that a sovereign possesses inherent adjudicatory
power over its domiciliaries is well established in both common and
civil law countries." A corporation is a domiciliary of the state of
its incorporation.' 2 Since a corporation itself is a fiction, its presence
8. See notes 88-97 infra and accompanying text.
9. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n. 37 (1977). See notes 111-120 infra and accompanying text.
10. The methodology of the Court's jurisdictional analysis is the key to ascertaining
whether various future jurisdictional assertions will be considered constitutional. See notes
80-87 infra and accompanying text.
11. See generally de Vries & Lowenfeld, Jurisdictionin PersonalActions-A Comparison
of Civil Law Views, 44 IOWA L. REV. 306 (1959); Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court
Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241 (hereinafter cited as Hazard); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction:The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J.
289 (1956) (hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig). The domicile basis provides that a defendant
must submit to the jurisdiction of the state of his domicile. "A state which accords privileges
and affords protection to . . . [a person] and his property by virtue of his domicile may also
exact reciprocal duties." Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). The domicile basis
provides for at least one forum in which every defendant may initially be brought. Although
a Court has in-personam jurisdiction the defendant may move the Court to decline to exercise
it under the doctrine of "forum non conveniens." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 508, 510
(1947). The doctrine is a discretionary one and involves the weighing of "oppression" inflicted
by forum inconvenience upon the defendant.
12. 4 WmGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1066 (1969).
However, it is interesting to note that for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the domicile is
the state of incorporation and the principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). See
Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdictionin Illinois, 1963
U. ILL. L.F. 533 [hereinafter cited as Currie], contending that it should be explicitly recognized that domicile is either the principal place of business or the incorporation state for inpersonam jurisdiction purposes. See notes 14-15 infra and accompanying text.
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outside the state of its origin is manifested through business activities. 3 When a corporation's activities are extensive and systematic
in a state, it may. be considered a de facto domiciliary. 4 Accordingly, a sovereign's inherent jurisdictional power may be asserted
over a corporation "doing business" in the state. 5 Notwithstanding
the corporation's lack of activity in the forum, it may voluntarily
submit itself to the sovereign's jurisdictional powers."5
13. "Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted
on as though it were a fact, . . . it is clear that unlike an individual its "presence" without,
as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its
behalf..." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
14. Professor Currie characterizes the corporation that is "doing business" continuously
in the forum as a habitual resident so that general jurisdiction is justified. Currie, supra note
12, at 585. See also von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1141 (1966) (hereinafter cited as von Mehren & Trautman).
15. "A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the
absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the State in such a manner and to such
an extent as to warrant the inference that it is present." (emphasis added). Philadelphia and
Reading R.R. v. Mckibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917). An alien corporation may also be deemed
"present" in the United States if it owns subsidiaries here and if it can be shown that the
parent controls its subsidiary to the extent that it can be considered a "mere department" of
the parent or an "agent" of the parent. Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336
F.2d 292 (6 Cir. 1964) (owning stock in a subsidiary may not alone render the alien parent
"present"); Freeman v. Gordon Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 398 F.Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (parent and subsidiary were integral parts of a whole sufficient to subject alien
subsidiary "present" in the U.S.); Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d
533, 537, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44, 227 N.E.2d 851, 854 (1967); Delagi v. Volkswagen Werk A.G.
of Wolfsburg, Germany, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 328 N.Y.S. 2d 653, 278 N.E. 2d 895 (1972).
The corporation which is "doing business" is subject to the general jurisdictional powers
of the forum state so that it may be sued on causes of action totally unrelated to the forum.
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 228 Mass. 584, 117 N.E. 913 (1917), aff'd without
opinion, 255 U.S. 565 (1918). See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 262, 115
N.E. 915, 918 (1917) (J. Cardozo): "We hold, further, that jurisdiction does not fail because
the cause of action sued upon has no relation in its origin to the business here transacted ...
The essential thing is that the corporation shall have come into the state. When once it is
here it may be served." Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898) (personal injury action
brought by New Jersey plaintiff against a British steamship corporation for injuries sustained
in Ireland; alien "doing business" in forum because of agents and offices there and therefore
"present" in forum).
The "doing business" basis has largely expanded and today requires much less than continuous and substantial activity in the forum in some states. See notes 82-87 infra and accompanying text.
16. The consent basis provides that a defendant may expressly or impliedly consent to a
state's jurisdiction. A defendant may expressly consent to a state court's jurisdiction with a
contract provision to that effect. National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311
(1964), or by filing an action in a state court as Plaintiff. If Defendant has counter-claimed
and Plaintiff subsequently dismisses the original action, jurisdiction over him still exists.
Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938). A defendant also "consents" when he makes a
general appearance to defend on the merits. WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, Civil § 1064 (1969). Most jurisdictions permit Defendant to make a special
appearance to contest in-personam jurisdiction, without submitting to jurisdiction in the
process. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 110, § 20 (1977). "Consent" to in-personam jurisdiction
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Traditionally a state's inherent jurisdictional powers operated
when some permanence existed in the relation between the defendant and the forum, 7 until 8 the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v.
Neff" declared that any presence in the forum was a constitutionally sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 0 Consequently Pennoyer extended jurisdiction to all persons or property physically located
within a state's territory. Any defendant who was found in the
forum and personally served there was subject to in personam jurisdiction irrespective of the extent or quality of contacts with the
state. 2 I Similarly, property situated in the state served as a basis to
is distinct from "consent" to quasi-in-rem. Quasi-in-rem objection procedures differ in various states. See notes 22-23 infra. State motor vehicle statutes were originally based on
"implied consent," Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), but are upheld under long-arm
statutes today subject to "minimum contacts" tests. See Currie, supra note 12.
Consent to international arbitration must be distinguished from both consent to jurisdiction and consent to choice-of-law. Arbitration is not a judicial proceeding but contractual
consent to arbitration before a foreign tribunal is consent to the exclusion of any other
remedy. See notes 153-57 infra. Contractual consent to the state law to be applied in the event
of a dispute is not consent to the jurisdiction of that state. Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972).
The fine distinction between choice-of-law and jurisdiction is important. See Hanson v.
Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
17. "Domicile" and "doing business" both require contacts of a permanent nature. In
addition, several courts have considered habitual residence a sufficiently permanent connection with the forum to exercise general jurisdiction over the resident defendant. See von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1137 n.32-33; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFUCT OF
LAws § 79 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
18. Actually, assertions were exercised prior to Pennoyer based upon personal service
within state boundaries, but this method had never been deemed constitutionally sufficient
with the Due Process Clause until Pennoyer decided that any defendant transiently in the
state could be personally served and thereby subject to the state's general jurisdictional
powers. It is interesting to note that Pennoyer deemed even these transients as equivalent to
an "inhabitant" of the forum. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
19. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
20. "'One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the
power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants; . . .The other
principle of. . .law [is that] . . . no State can exercise direct jurisdiction . . over persons
or property without its territory." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). For an in-depth
discussion of the history of the Pennoyer decision and its influence on the traditional bases
of in-personam jurisdiction, see Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction,73 HARv.
L. Rzv. 909 (1960) (hereinafter cited as Developments); Kurland, The Supreme Court, the
Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-FromPennoyer to
Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 569 (1958) (hereinater cited as Kurland); von Mehren
& Trautman, supra note 14.
21. "The general rule is that every country has jurisdiction over all persons found within
its territorial limits. . . .It is not a debatable question, that such actions may be maintained
in any jurisdiction in which the defendant may be found, and is legally served with process."
Smith v. Gibson, 83 Ala. 284, 284, 3 So. 321 (1887). Thus, in Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F.
Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959), a non-resident defendant was served while in a plane flying over
Arkansas and the court held that service was proper and that personal jurisdiction existed.
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either compel a non-resident defendant to appear, and submit generally to jurisdiction of the forum, or lose his property in default. 2
Although this quasi-in-rem procedure was technically an exercise of
territorial jurisdiction, in so far as it compelled a nonresident de24
fendant to appear,23 it was in effect extraterritorial.
The Supreme Court explicitly recognized a state's power to assert
jurisdiction extraterritorially in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington. 21 The non-resident corporate defendant argued that its
business activity did not constitute "doing business," and therefore
it was not susceptible to the state's territorial jurisdictional powers.
The Court held that the state's inherent jurisdictional power may
extend beyond its geographical boundaries when the cause of action
Such an exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant for a cause of action unrelated
to his presence in the state illustrates the "transient rule." Ehrenzweig, supra note 11, at 295.
There are few limitations on the use of the "transient rule"; Croucher v. Croucher, 51111. App.
2d 17, 200 N.E.2d 854 (1964) (defendant fraudulently induced to enter state for purposes of
service to obtain jurisdiction; jurisdiction not upheld); Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128
(1916) (defendant served when in state as a witness or party to another proceeding; jurisdiction not upheld). The transient rule is commonly used today. See Donald Manter Co., Inc.
v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1976) (service on a non-resident corporation while temporarily in the forum was a proper way of exercising jurisdiction under the "presence" basis
because a state has power over things and persons in its territory).
22. Attachment of property located in the forum may serve as the basis for in-rem or
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Actions "quasi-in-rem" are similar to "in-rem" only in that they
involve property and judgments thereunder are limited to the value of the property. However,
quasi-in-rem differs from in-rem in three respects. First, the subject matter of the claim is
not the property, but a personal claim against the defendant. Second, and third, the purpose
of the attachment is either to compel defendant to appear generally and submit to full inpersonam jurisdiction, or to secure the property so that it may be applied to a judgment
against the defendant. Traditionally, "quasi-in-rem" actions have also been labeled "against
property" but this has largely been changed by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See
note 39 infra and accompanying text. Quasi-in-rem has been criticized because of its coercive
nature and because property may be attached which exceeds the value of the personal claim.
Under these circumstances, plaintiff will have the beneficial effect of satisfying his judgment
against defendant in full without bearing the burden of justifying in-personam jurisdiction
over the defendant. See Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction:Outmoded and Unconstitutional? 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 668 (1975); Kurland, supra note 20; von Mehren & Tratuman,
supra note 14; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 n.23 (1977).
23. Some jurisdictions permit defendant to make a "limited" appearance to contest
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, much like a "special" appearance to contest in-personam jurisdiction. If defendant does not prevail on his "limited" appearance, any further action towards
defending on the merits constitutes "consent" to in-personam jurisdiction. See Cheshire
National Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N.E. 500 (1916).
24. The extraterritorial effect occurs because the defendant is a non-resident of the forum,
but he is forced to submit to general jurisdiction as if he were a habitual resident or a
domiciliary.
25. Plaintiff brought an action against a foreign corporation to recover unpaid unemployment conpensation taxes. Defendant argued that its business transactions did not amount
to the quantity required for the "doing business" basis. The Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction on another basis and labelled it "minimum contacts." 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 10

arises out of such minimal acts within the forum."6 Since extraterritorial jurisdiction could not be based upon the sovereign's territorial power, the focus became the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the cause of action. 27 This requisite relationship for the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction was present
when "minimum contacts" were shown to exist.28
The InternationalShoe "minimum contacts" test was tempered
by the requirement of "fundamental fairness" to the defendant.',
The Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla30 clearly established that
this fairness involved more than a question of practical inconvenience to the defendant . 3 A "fair" assertion of jurisdiction also must
be based upon traditional notions of state adjudicatory power which
32
proscribe an infringement upon the sovereignity of another state.
Accordingly, that power must depend on a finding of some
"minimum contacts" with the forum through which the defendant
"purposefully" avails himself of the privileges and benefits of conducting activities relative to the forum.33
Shaffer v. Heitner
In Shaffer v. Heitner,34 an Oregon resident brought a shareholder
THE DECISION:

26. "But now.., due process requires. . . contacts with . . .(the state) such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play'...". International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Thus, the rationale of the "minimum
contacts" basis is "fairness", but the test is one of relationships.See notes 27, 31-33, infra.
Nevertheless, there is recurring confusion between InternationalShoe's "fairness" concept
and the "fairness" concept of forum non conveniens. See Ehrenzweig, From State Jurisdiction to Interstate Venue, 50 ORE. L. Rlv. 103 (1971) (construing language in Shoe as
identical to forum non conveniens); Contra, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211, 215 (drawing a sharp distinction between a convenient forum and a proper basis of jurisdiction).
27. "So far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within
the state, . . .[jurisdiction is proper]." (emphasis added) 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). Thus,
there must be a relationshipbetween defendant, the forum, and the cause of action. See also
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
28. See note 31 infra and note 27 supra.
29. See note 26 supra.
30. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
31. "[Hlowever minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may
not be called upon to do so unless he has had the "minimal contacts" with that State that
are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him." Id. "It is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails [him]self of the privileges of conducting activities within the forum State..." Id. at 253.
32. See generally Hazard, supra note 11, at 265: "[S]overeign states manifest toward
their relations with other sovereign states, one of jealous concern for a local monopoly of
political power and legal authority," See also Currie, supra note 12, at 533-34, where Professor
Currie explains that "fairness" is related to an intuitive sense of justice which causes outrage
when a State exerts unjustified power. That power is justified only when the defendant has
a relation to the forum.
33. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
34. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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derivative suit in a Delaware state court against directors and officers of a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of business
in Arizona. The acts relevant to the cause of action took place in
Oregon.3 Jurisdiction was predicated on attachment 3 of the defendants' stock, which was deemed by statute to have Delaware as its
situs.17 Thus, the plaintiff asserted the classical jurisdictional basis

of quasi-in-rem to obtain in-personam jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants.
The defendants argued that the Delaware Court did not have
jurisdiction because the defendants lacked the requisite "minimum
contacts" with Delaware according to InternationalShoe. The
Court of Chancery refused to apply the "minimum contacts" test
stressing that quasi-in-rem and "minimum contacts" were mutually exclusive bases of jurisdiction. The Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed.1 The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court
rejected the traditional notion that a proceeding quasi-in-rem was
"against" property and concluded that it was actually "against" the
person who owned the property. The court held that since the
actual purpose and effect of the quasi-in-rem assertion was to compel the defendant to appear, it constituted an indirect exercise of
personal jurisdiction which was violative of the Due Process Clause
0
of the Constitution.'

The Court recognized that quasi-in-rem jurisdiction entailed an
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and therefore applied the
minimum contacts standard of InternationalShoe. 4' The Shaffer
Court analyzed the contacts that existed between the officers and
the state of Delaware, and rejected the argument that Delaware's
interest in the action should control when the defendants' activities
were unconnected to that forum.' 2 The Court further dismissed the
35. Defendants allegedly violated their duty to Greyhound by incurring $13,146,090 in
damages in an antitrust suit and a fine for criminal contempt. 433 U.S. 186, 190 n.2 (1977).
36. DEL. CODE tit. 10 § 366(a)(1975).
37. DE. CODE tit. 8 § 169 (1975).
38. The Court of Chancery and Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the jurisdiction argument summarily. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (1976).
39. 433 U.S. 186, 207, 212 (1977).
40. "[Ilf a direct assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would violate the
Constitution, it would seem that an indirect assertion of that jurisdiction should be equally
impermissible." Id. at 209.
41. "We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." Id. at 212.
Although the Court used the word "all," it must have been alluding to all extraterritorial
assertions, such as quasi-in-rem. This conclusion is most logical, especially when the Court
first decided that quasi-in-remwas actually against persons who were absent from the forum.

Id.
42.

Id. at 212-15.
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argument that the acceptance of an office in a corporation formed
by Delaware law constituted purposeful availment of the privilege
of conducting activities in the forum sufficient for "minimum contacts."4 3 The Court instead looked to the relationship between the
defendants, the forum, and the cause of action and determined that
since "minimum contacts" were lacking jurisdiction did not exist."
Shaffer employs a methodology for jurisdictional analysis which
places substance over form. 5 Moreover, the decision establishes
that the underlying basis for all extraterritorial jurisdiction must
be a meaningful as opposed to purely fictional relationship with the
forum." Shaffer reaffirms the time-honored maxim that, "great
caution should be used not to let fiction deny fair play, that can be
secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact.47" Accordingly, while
the fictional contacts"' of a non-resident may provide a component"
of the requisite jurisdictional basis, the inquiry into whether a constitutionally sufficient basis exists must include the overall quality
of the defendant's contacts with the forum. 0
THE AFTERMATH OF SHAFFER

Quasi-In-Rem
The immediate result of Shaffer was a reconsideration of the permissible scope, and continuing validity of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.5 1 Shaffer clearly invalidated assertions of quasi-in-rem juris43. Id. at 215-16.
44. Id. at 216.
45. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 200 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 638 (1978), reh. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2023 (1979); Symposium: The Impact of Shaffer v.
Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273, 317, 322.
46. The fictions utilized in the lower courts were twofold. First, the property had only a
fictional situs in Delaware. But more significantly, the Courts had utilized the fiction that
quasi-in-rem was an action against property and not the person. Furthermore, the Shaffer
Court reaffirmed the limits of state power by requiring a forum to justify its exertion based
on purposeful ties to the state.
47. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (Holmes, J.).
48. In the Shaffer case the fictional contacts were the property "in" the forum.
49. The Court noted that the property in the forum may still be relevant to a jurisdictional
"contacts" assessment, to the extent that it may be viewed as one of the several contacts to
be evaluated against the Shoe test, provided that the property relates to the cause of action.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1977).
50. "The Due Process Clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment . . . against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
contacts, .ties, or relations." Id. at 216. "It is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails [him]self of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state ..
"(emphasis added) Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958),
cited in, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
51. See generally, Vernon, Single FactorBases of In Personam Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273; Note, The Constitutionality
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diction where the property attached has a fictional situs and is
wholly unrelated to the cause of action in the forum. 5 Further, the
principles enunciated in Shaffer cast doubt on the efficacy of the
quasi-in-rem form of jurisdiction since it is no longer readily distinguishable from an assertion of extraterritorial in personam.5 3 Nevertheless, some courts have retained the use of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, and applied a minimum contacts test to determine its constitutionality.54 Although there is apparent agreement among such
courts that the applicable standard is minimum contacts, the substance of the test has been interpreted differently 5 5 Consequently
there are four distinct variations which have emerged, and each
embraces the term "minimum contacts."
1.

Purposeful Availment

The "purposeful availment" test 56 examines the circumstances
under which the property was placed in the forum. If the court finds
that the property was intentionally placed in the state,57 the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum. Under such circumstances, the assertion of
of Seider v. Roth after Shaffer v. Heitner, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 409 (1978); Comment, Shaffer
v. Heitner: The Supreme Court Establishes A Uniform Approach to State Court Jurisdiction,
35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131 (1978); Comment, Jurisdiction-Exerciseof In Rem and Quasi
In Rem JurisdictionJustified Only Where InternationalShoe Minimum Contacts Standard
Is Satisfied, 11 VAND. J. TRANSL. L. 159, 168-69 (1978).
52. "Thus, although the presence of the defendant's property in a State might suggest the
existence of other ties among the defendant, the [forum] and the litigation, the presence of
the property alone would not support the State'sjurisdiction." (emphasis added) Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1977).
53. See Carolina Power & Light Company v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1047 (N.D. Calif.
1977): "Shaffer ... has abrogated quasi-in-rem jurisdiction as a separate and insular concep; Zammit, Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15
tual category .
(1978).
54. See notes 56-70 infra and accompanying text.
55. See notes 56-70 infra and accompanying text.
56. See Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). A wrongful death
action was brought against the alien corporation to recover damages for death occurring in
Turkey. Plaintiff first attempted to predicate jurisdiction under the "doing business" basis.
The court said that the quantity of activity in the forum was insufficient to sustain inpersonam jurisdiction. Plaintiff then attached, in 1976, defendant's bank account in New
York in an amount which exceeded the value of Plaintiff's personal claim against defendant.
Defendant moved, in 1977, to dismiss on the ground that the quasi-in-rem attachment was
unconstitutional under Shaffer. The court upheld jurisdiction.
57. Id. at 1277. The court admitted that the property attached was wholly unrelated to
the plaintiff's cause of action. They narrowed Shaffer by noting that in Shaffer, the defendants "never set foot in Delaware." Id. The court noted that all Shaffer requires is that
defendant have "purposefully availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities" in the
forum. Id. The court next decided that opening an unrelated bank account was a sufficiently
"purposeful" act. Id. at 1278.
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jurisdiction is justified on the grounds of implicit consent by the
non-resident defendant. 8 The concept of fairness itself revolves
around the expectancies of the property owner.5 9
2.

Quantum of Contacts

The "quantum of contacts" standard 0 permits an exercise of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in any state in which property is situated
if there is, in addition, some other contact by defendant with the
state. 61 The property is regarded as adding weight to the sum total
of contacts.6 2 It is not necessary, under this standard, that there be
sufficient, independent "contacts" to justify in-personam jurisdic63 tion, or that the property itself be related to the cause of action.
3.
Another test

64

Degree of Unfairness to Defendant
relies on the "fundamental fairness" language of

58. Id. at 1278. The court quoted Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Shaffer in determining that attachment of an unrelated bank account should support quasi-in-rem:"If I visit
another state, or acquire real estate or open a bank account in it, I knowingly assume some
risk that the state will exercise its power over my property or my person while there. My
contact with the state, though minimal, gives rise to predictable risks." Following this rule,
an alien corporation is subject to jurisdiction in any court in any state in which it owns real
estate or other tangible property, regardless of the relation of that property to the cause of
action.
59. The flaw in this reasoning is that Shaffer recognized that quasi-in-rem is no longer
an action "against property," but rather is an indirect action "against persons" who own the
property. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text. Therefore, it could be argued that
one who opens a bank account does not expect the state to exercise power over his person,
through his property in the forum.
60. In Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978), the New
York plaintiff attached an unrelated third-party debt owed defendant in a forum where the
debtor was "doing business." The value of the attached debt exceeded the value of Plaintiff's
claim against the non-resident defendant for wrongful rejection of shipments of meat. Quasiin-rem attachment was sustained in light of Shaffer.
61. Id. at 1021-22. The court read Shaffer as requiring that defendant have "contacts"
with the state. The court said that the "minimum contacts" standard applied to quasiin-rem, and permits the consideration of the property as one of the several contacts with the
state, even if the property is unrelated to the cause of action.
62. The court concluded that even though defendant never entered the forum, or negotiated in the forum, or signed the contract there, the sending of the offer by Plaintiff trom the
forum rendered the contract "if... not born in New York, . . . at least conceived [there]
[I]t seems evident that the substantial connection of the contract with New York must
be considered along with the added factor of the attachment of an intangible within the
(emphasis added) Id.
jurisdiction of the state in weighing the minimum contacts .....
at 1023.
63. Id. at 1018-1022 n.5.
64. The cases following the approach of weighing unfairness to the defendant stem from
the New York case where a non-resident's insurance policy is attached in a forum where the
insurer is "doing business." Jurisdiction was originally predicated on the then-stable quasiin-rem basis. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966). The
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InternationalShoe 5 and places emphasis on the practical harm to
the defendant if the action is maintained in the forum where the
property is attached. 6 In addition, the benefits accruing to the
plaintiff are weighed. 7 Even if the defendant has no other contacts
with the state, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction may be permissible.
The first three views above are not overwhelmingly subscribed to.
Shaffer is most often interpreted as requiring either that the property be related to the cause of action, or, if the property is unrelated,
that a tripartite relationship exist between the defendant, the forum
and the cause of action before jurisdiction may be exercised. Thus,
the "minimum contacts" test is mainly viewed as requiring more
than notice, more than a conglomeration of separately insufficient
contacts, and more than general fairness to the defendant. Rather,
''minimum contacts" requires a test of relationships.
Relationship Between the Property and the Cause of Action
InternationalShoe's "minimum contacts" test is most often regarded as requiring a relationship between the defendant, the forum
4.

practice has been highly criticized both before and after Shaffer. See generally Reese, The
Expanding Scope of Jurisdictionover Non-Residents-New York Goes Wild, 35 INS. COUNSEL
J. 118 (1968); Comment, Attachment of "Obligations"-A New Chapter in Long-Arm
Jurisdiction,16 BUFFALO L. REV. 769 (1967); Note, New Constitutional Questions Concerning
Seider v. Roth, 6 HoFswA L. Rav. 393 (1978). But see Smit, The Enduring Utility oflIn-Rem
Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L.' REV. 600, 621-27 (1977)
(Seider-attachments are "reasonable" when limited to only resident-plaintiffs and the
face-value of the policy attached); Note, The Constitutionalityof Seider v. Roth after Shaffer
v. Heitner, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 409 (1978) (since the practice is analogous to "direct action"
statutes, which have already been deemed "constitutional," the practice causes no additional
harm that would not be caused defendant anyway).
Most recently, in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Packing Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 638 (1978), reh. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2023 (1979), the court upheld a Seidertype attachment in light of Shaffer.
65. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
66. 579 F.2d at 200. The court discussed the fact that "direct action" statutes, which
name only the insurer as both the real party in interest and the defendant, have been considered constitutional. The court read Shaffer as primarily doing away with fictions and
focusing on realities. Id. The court said that in reality, the insurer must bear all the cost of
the litigation and since the policy is attached where the insurer is "doing business" it is not
inconvenient to him. Id. at 201. Furthermore, the court recognized that even though Defendant had no contacts with the forum, the practical harm to him would be "minimal." Id.
at 198-202.
Such reasoning, nevertheless, is in conflict with Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251
(1958), where the Supreme Court stated: "However minimal the burden of defending in a
foreign tribunal a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal
contacts' with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him."
67. "[Tjhere has been 'a movement away from the bias favoring the defendant' in matters of personal jurisdiction 'toward permitting the plaintiff to insist that the defendant come
to him' when there is a sufficient basis for doing so." O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579
F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1978).
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and the cause of action. s This fourth test, however, requires only a
relationship between the property, the forum and the cause of action." Even if the defendant's contacts are otherwise insufficient to
exercise in-personam jurisdiction, courts following this test would
permit quasi-in-rem jurisdiction under Shaffer.7 0
Analysis
These variations of the "minimum contacts" test are actually
expressions of four interpretations of "fairness." Although
''minimum contacts" has been criticized as an elusive and illdefined concept,". the essential guidelines for application of the test
are articulated in the Shaffer decision. There, the Court evaluated
the defendants' contacts, concentrating on relationships: "[Tihe
property is not the subject matter of the litigation, nor is the underlying cause of action related to the property."7 The Court next
stated that the jurisdictional analysis should focus upon the
defendants' acts.7 3 The Court rejected the arguments that fairness
and convenience alone should support jurisdiction when defendants
lacked other ties to Delaware."
Subsequent to Shaffer all assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction should begin with an inquiry into relationships.7 5 The first three
views above fail to require any relationship between the property or
68. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
69. See National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). The District Court held that a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of
business in New York, may assert jurisdiction over the Nigerian government and a Nigerian
bank by the attachment of funds and treasury bills on deposit in New York banks which were
directly related to payments due Plaintiff under a letter of credit. "The funds held by Morgan
were the source of payments made under the letter of credit or which would have been made
but for the disputes which subsequently arose. Therefore, these funds would appear to have
a sufficient nexus to plaintiff's cause of action to justify the attachment as a basis for quasiin-rem jurisdiction." Id. at 635. The court evaluated Defendant's "contacts" with New York
and admitted that entering into a correspondent bank relationship was not alone sufficient
contacts to sustain in-personamjurisdiction under the transaction-of-business long-arm statute. Id. at 637. The court permitted in-personam jurisdiction based on the same contacts,
but justified it on the basis that the defendant had caused an "effect" in New York. Id. at
635-39.
70. See also Marketing Showcase, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 445 F. Supp. 755, 758
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
71. Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware:A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 73 COLUM. L.
REV. 749, 767 (1973).
72. 433 U.S. 186, 212-13 (1977).
73. Id. at 213-15.
74. Id.
75. "Thus, the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather
than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest,
became the central concern of the inquiry . . ."Id. at 206.
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the defendant, the forum, and the cause of action. Accordingly, to
the extent that these relationships are not required, such quasi-inrem jurisdiction conflicts with Shaffer. The fourth view above is
consistent with Shaffer's requirement of a relationship to the cause
of action, but may conflict with Shaffer's recognition of the extraterritorial nature of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction." Shaffer defined
quasi-in-rem as an indirect assertion of jurisdiction over a person.7 7
The fourth view above" which focuses only on the property's
connection to the cause of action, ignores the relationship of the
non-resident defendant and therefore may be inconsistent with
Shaffer.79
It is not totally clear whether the relation of the non-resident
defendant's property to the cause of action is a constitutionally
sufficient connection to justify a quasi-in-rem assertion, after
Shaffer. The Shaffer Court did note that when the property is related to the cause of action, factors contemporaneous with the property will probably render the defendant subject to personal long-arm
jurisdiction and therefore, there will be no need to assert jurisdiction
quasi-in-rem.
In instances where the non-resident defendant's contacts would
not support typical long-arm jurisdiction, but the property in the
forum is related to the cause of action, it is arguable that Shaffer
would permit a quasi-in-rem assertion based on that property. One
argument may point to the difference between quasi-in-rem and inpersonam, labelling quasi-in-rem only an indirect assertion over a
person, which leaves the defendant with the option of defaulting,
and relinquishing no more than the value of the property attached.
Shaffer does not strongly support this argument, however, because
the Court noted that even a minimally unjustified assertion is nevertheless improper.
A better argument is that a quasi-in-rem assertion is justifiable
when the property is related to the cause of action, not because it
hurts the defendant "only a little," but because "minimum contacts" exist between the defendant's property, the forum, and the
cause of action. It is arguable that Shaffer would permit this separate "minimum contacts" test, applicable to property, to support
76. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
77. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
79. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §11, Comment c, Illustration 1 (explaining
the conflict in reasoning that quasi-in-rem is valid if "minimum contacts" exist, because once
"minimum contacts" exist there is no need for quasi-in-rem since in-personam jurisdiction
can then be exercised).
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quasi-in-rem jurisdiction"s when in-personam jurisdiction does not

otherwise exist.
In most cases, however, when the property is related to the cause
of action, but in-personam jurisdiction does not exist under usual
long-arm statutes, personal jurisdiction may still exist under the
"causing an effect" in the forum approach. 8' Thus, when the nonresident defendant places property in the forum which is substantially related to the cause of action, the defendant may be deemed
to have caused an effect in the forum which would be a sufficient
basis for in-personam, as opposed to quasi-in-rem, jurisdiction.
Doing Business
The Shaffer decision may also herald a trend towards requiring
more meaningful connections between a non-resident corporate defendant, and a forum state before general territorial jurisdiction is
established.8 2 The traditional requirement of "doing business" is
satisfied by systematic and continuous activity by the defendant in
the forum state.8 However, recently this threshold requirement has
been relaxed 4 to such an extent that "doing business" can, in effect,
80. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The Court first declared that the standards
of InternationalShoe applied and immediately thereafter noted that the property was unrelated to the cause of action. The Court concluded: "Appellants holdings in Greyhound do not,
therefore, provide contacts with Delaware sufficient to support the jurisdiction of that state's
courts . . ." Id. at 213. It could be argued that such language indicates that if the cause of
action were related to the property, such contacts with the forum would then have been
sufficient to support jurisdiction quasi-in-rem in Delaware.
81. The 2d Circuit held in Federal Republic of Nigeria v. National American Corp., 448
F. Supp. 622 (1978), that property related to the cause of action was a sufficient contact to
render the alien defendant amenable to personaljurisdiction under an "effects" statute. See
notes 136-52 infra and accompanying text. It is interesting to note, however, that the court
first interpreted Shaffer as permitting quasi-in-remjurisdiction based on related property in
the forum. Id. at 635. Due to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1977),
however, which the court read as precluding quasi-in-rem, the court proceeded to exercise
personal jurisdiction based on the defendant's same contacts. The court hinged personal
jurisdiction on an exception to the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(2), which requires that the
sovereign-defendant act commercially outside the United States to cause an effect within.
Id. at 637. The case exemplifies that in most instances when the property is related to the
cause of action, personal jurisdiction will probably exist, relieving the need to base jurisdiction on quasi-in-rem.
82. Traditionally, territorial jurisdiction could not be exercised unless the connections
were meaningful. This meaningfulness was derived from the permanence between the forum
and the defendant. See notes 11-17 supra and accompanying text.
83. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. For an exhaustive list of varying "doing
business" standards, see WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil §106769; Developments, supra note 20, at 919-23.
84. See, e.g., St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co. v. Gitchoff, 68 Ill. 2d 38, 369 N.E.2d 52 (1977) (Court
exercised personal jurisdiction over Missouri defendant on an unrelated cause of action
brought by non-resident Plaintiff. Defendant found to be "doing business" in Illinois by
existence of a sales office, seven sales employees and one assistant superintendent expediter;
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be an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction. 5 The result may be
that jurisdiction is predicated and sustained on tenuous contacts
with a state, where both the plaintiff and defendant as well as the
cause of action are totally unconnected to any activity the defendant may conduct in the forum."6 Under such circumstances, the
"doing business" contacts are insufficient to qualify the nonresident as a de facto domiciliary. 7 Therefore, the assertion of jurisdiction must pass muster under the minimum contacts test for
extraterritorial jurisdiction." This, in turn, should prompt courts
to interpret "doing business" as requiring a more substantial
connection with the forum.89
STATE ADJUDICATORY

POWER AND ALIENS

The context of jurisdictional assertions over aliens often involves
unique policy considerations. 0 Although greater flexibility may be
required, it is questionable whether entirely different standards are
appropriate." Admittedly, the Due Process Clause of the FourCo. ran no tracks through Illinois). Cf. Currie, supra note 12, at 585 ("[Bjecause many
corporations do business in a great many States, this practice is subject to abuse; it would
be better if fewer suits for accidents occurring in rural States were filed against railroads in
distant urban centers where there is a tendency toward large jury verdicts.").
85. The metamorphisis of "doing business" from a territorial to an extraterritorial assertion occurs only when jurisdiction is predicated on less-than continuous and systematic
activity in the forum, and the cause of action is unrelated to the defendant's activity in the
state. Thus, if a defendant corporation is not acting to an extent that it can be considered a
"resident" of the forum, any assertion of jurisdiction must thereafter be labelled extraterritorial, and "minimum contacts" are thereafter required before an exercise of jurisdiction is
constitutional.
86. See, e.g., Marketing Showcase Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Company, 445 F. Supp. 755
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). A Delaware corporate defendant had first moved for dismissal on the ground
that attachments were unconstitutional under Shaffer. The court acknowledged that the
quasi-in-rem was improper but then held that the corporation was subject to in-personam
jurisdiction under the "doing business" basis. Defendant's "activities" sufficient to constitute
his "presence" in New York amounted to the existence of eleven sales men and one sales
manager who resided there. The Company maintained no office in New York. But see, e.g.,

Tillay v. Idaho Power Co., 425 F. Supp. 376 (D.D.C. 1976) (where cause of action is unrelated,
a strict test of "doing business" is required).
87. See notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text.
88. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Tillay v. Idaho Power Co., 425 F. Supp. 376 (D.D.C. 1976) (where the cause
of action is unrelated, a strict test of doing business is required).
90. The policy considerations include federalism, comity, Congressional power to regulate
international affairs and hardships to both the defendant and the plaintiff. See note 89 supra
and accompanying text.
91. The Constitutional protections of freedom of speech and the press are accorded to
aliens residing in this country. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). Aliens are entitled to
invoke the Equal Protection Clause, and have been held to have standing under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See Roberto v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 177 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1949); 3 AM. JvR. 2d, Aliens & Citizens, § 5, § 36, § 43, § 45 (1978).
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teenth Amendment itself has long been interpreted as restricting
one State from overexerting its jurisdictional powers so that it does
not infringe upon the sovereignity of another State. 2 Obviously if
the jurisdictional question only involves a state and another country, the sovereignty of a fellow state can not be offended. Since such
a jurisdictional conflict would not involve a question of interplay
between states within the federal system, it may be argued that
jurisdictional rules governing assertions over domestic defendants
are inapplicable . 3 However, this argument assumes that the Due
Process Clause is solely a device to regulate interaction among
states, and of course such a construction is not strictly accurate.
Due process also embodies traditional concepts of fairness which
require sufficient contacts with the forum exercising jurisdiction. 4
Thus, the fact that interests of federalism are absent should not
obviate jurisdictional due process for aliens. 5 Accordingly, the general standards for jurisdiction over aliens and domestic defendants
States have been allowed to treat aliens separately in some instances, but within narrow
limits. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1948). It has been
urged that more harsh jurisdictional treatment of aliens may invite retaliatory jurisdictional
assertions abroad. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969)
(Ely, J., dissenting); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1127. Furthermore, the
Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power to regulate international affairs. Some
have warned that a distinct set of jurisdictional rules by states for aliens is preempted by
Congress's powers. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14; Comment, Civil ProcedureLong Arm Statutes: JurisdictionOver Alien Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 18
WAYNE L. REv. 1585, 1589 (1972). Others have argued that not only equal but preferential
treatment should be accorded aliens in the context of jurisdiction. Special Project, Obtaining
PersonalJurisdictionOver Alien Corporations-ASurvey of U.S. Practice,9 VAND. J. TRANS.
L. 345, 373 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Survey).
92. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, Divorce Jurisdictionafter
the 1977 Amendment to the Illinois Long Arm Statute: Extending a Legal Doctrine or Creating a Legal Hallucination, Loy. Cm. L. J. 893, 897-99 (1978).
93. Due to the unique status of an alien, the Court permitted "minimum contacts" to be
based on the aggregate of the alien-defendant's United States contacts, as opposed to the
alien's contacts with the particular forum in Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp.,
362 F. Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973); But see Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co.,
556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977):
If policy considerations do indeed dictate that an alien-defendant's contacts with
the entire United States should be aggregated, and if the Constitution does not
forbid such a practice-at least where the plaintiff is suing in federal court on a
federal cause of action, the Federal Rules should be amended to authorize such a
practice. Such a step is, however, not ours to take.
94. See notes 26 and 31 supra and accompanying text.
95. The courts have mainly followed the proposition that the same due process standards
should apply to aliens. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954); Velandra v. Regie
Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292, 294 n.7 (6th Cir. 1964) [citing Cheatham, Some
Developments in Conflict of Laws, 17 VAND. L. REv. 193, 195, 200 (1963)]; Standard Corp.
v. Benelal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24-25 (E.D. Pa. 1972); SEC & Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 748-49
(D. Md. 1968).
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are similarly tempered by minimal guarantees of fairness.9
Notwithstanding such uniformity there are usually practical constraints which must be considered in an analysis of a jurisdictional
assertion over an alien. 7 An evaluation of the total circumstances
surrounding the plaintiff, forum, defendant and cause of action
should include unique conditions which are inherent in the factual
context involving an alien. 8 For example, a plaintiff may be faced
with a choice of either traveling across continents to litigate under
foreign laws or of obtaining no satisfaction because the alien does
not "fit" into any conventional jurisdictional base. As a practical
matter, it is necessary for the standard to be flexible enough to
provide for such exigencies. To the extent that such a variance itself'
is compelled by due process, a state remains within the scope of its
adjudicatory power."
PROPERTY OWNED By ALIEN CORPORATIONS IN THE FORUM

The following hypotheticals will illustrate the unique problems
that accompany the application of Shaffer v. Heitner to jurisdictional assertions over aliens owning property in the United States.
Possible solutions will be presented that attempt to reconcile the
rationale of Shaffer with these examples of extraterritorial problems.
1.

The Property as Security.

Assume that an alien coproration's only assets in the United
States are property holdings within State Z. Further assume that
this alien corporation acts within the borders of States X and Y. The
initial question is whether X or Y may assert jurisdiction over the
corporation. The problem is somewhat analogous to the domestic
jurisdictional dispute from which Shaffer arose.10 The jurisdictional
analysis should begin with an examination of the "contacts" to
determine if there existed a relationship between the defendant, the
forum, and the cause of action.'' Assuming, that "minimum con96. "And the fairness of jurisdiction 'is applicable to foreign parties as it is to citizens of
this country'." United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
97. Cf. Survey, supra note 89 (contends that the unique conditions of aliens must not be
ignored in a jurisdictional analysis).
98. The analysis should not be one which treats an alien differently because he is an alien.
Rather, the analysis would consider all the relevant factors before jurisdiction is denied or
granted.
99. See notes 111-135 infra and accompanying text.
100. The Shaffer jurisdictional question was a domestic one because it involved two or
more states. Thus, the federalism restraints on state adjudicatory power are called into play,
and the usual jurisdictional rules should apply. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
101. See notes 27, 52, 75 supra and accompanying text.
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tacts" do exist in State X or State Y, a question arises concerning
the property located in State Z. Clearly if the property in State Z
is unrelated to the cause of action, this property alone may not serve
as a basis for jurisdiction in State Z over the alien corporation. It is
important to note, however, that Shaffer recognizes that the property in State Z may constitutionally be attached as security for a
judgment rendered in State X or State Y.102 Such an attachment
would thereafter serve as a provisional remedy, as opposed to a basis
of jurisdiction.
Despite the fact that such a provisional attachment is constitutional, a plaintiff may be unable to gain pre-judgment access to the
defendant's property in State Z if that state lacks an authorizing
statute.'" Moreover, state statutes which exist may not provide for
security attachments unless the cause of action is brought in the
attaching state, or the property is owned by one who does business
in the state.'" Such statutes fail to provide broad security attachments, in part, because prior to Shaffer the attachment itself served
as a basis for jurisdiction. Legislative action is necessary to revise
attachment statutes to include a procedure for attaching a nonresident's property as security for a judgment rendered in an action
pending in another forum.
If State Z does provide by statute for security attachment, the
nature of the property's existence in that state should be examined
before attachment ensues. 05 For example, if the property in State
Z is a plane which is temporarily in the forum for repairs, it may
be labelled "property . . . merely moving through the state in
transit to another country."'" While attachment in that situation
102. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. "[A] State in which property is located
should have jurisdiction to attach that property,. . . as security for a judgment being sought
in a forum where the litigation can be maintained consistently with International Shoe
...
" Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977). See also Carolina Power & Light Company v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1047-48 (N.D. Calif. 1977).
103. Hence, in Omni Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Actividades Aereas Aragonesas, S.A., No. 774012 (9th Cir., filed Dec. 27, 1977), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 77-669 (filed July
20, 1978), the plaintiff Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Washington, attempted to attach the Spanish defendant's plane as security for a judgment rendered
elsewhere. The District Court, No. 77-4012 (D. Ariz., Nov. 15, 1977), held that Arizona's
statute did not provide for broad attachments of any property located in the forum, unless
the action was being brought there. Thus, the court decided that regardless of the constitutionality of the procedure, Arizona did not authorize it and therefore the plaintiff could not
utilize it.
104. See note 101 supra; ARiz. REv. STAT. § 12-1521(3); § 12- 2401-2412.
105. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (N.D. Calif.
1977); Omni Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Activadades Aeras Aragoneses, S.A., No. 77-4012, 5 (D.
Ariz. Nov. 15, 1977).
106. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (N.D. Calif. 1977).
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may be improper, such a determination should rest on the general
principle drived from Shaffer that requires property to be in a state
as a result of the defendant having "purposefully" placed it there.', 7
Of course, this rule does not permit a defendant to remove its assets
temporarily from a territory to become judgment-proof.'0 Moreover,
by its very nature such a removal constitutes a purposeful placement.
It follows from the foregoing that the debt of a non-party to an
alien defendant may be attached as security if, through the ordinary
course of the alien-defendant's business, removal of the property is
imminent.' 9 This conclusion does not conflict with Shaffer's rejection of the Harris v. Balk"' type attachment since it differs from
that kind of attachment in two ways. First, in Harris the purpose
of the attachment was to compel the defendant to submit to jurisdiction."' In the proposed attachment, the purpose of the attachment is merely to serve as security. Second, in Harristhe defendant
was totally unable to control the situs of the debt, as it was deemed
to travel with the debtor." ' Thus, the Harris defendant had no
reasonable expectation regarding where the attachment might
occur. In the proposed attachment, however, unrelated debts may
be attached in the place where the debtor is "doing business."
Under this requirement, the defendant would be able to reasonably
ascertain where the attachment is likely to occur from the inception
of the debtor-creditor relationship.
2.

Jurisdiction By Necessity

The jurisdictional question becomes increasingly difficult when it
cannot be concluded that the alien "acted" in the United States. If
an alien corporation acts outside the United States, it will be nearly
impossible under most state statutes to conclude that the alien has
107. Id. Examples of property purposefully placed in the State are bank accounts and
land.
108. "The primary rationale for treating the presence of property as a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims over which the state would not have jurisdiction if
International Shoe applied is that a wrongdoer should not be able to avoid payment of his
obligations by . . . removing his assets to a place where he is not subject to an in-personam
suit." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 (1977).
109. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Calif. 1977).
110. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). The Court upheld personal jurisdiction based
upon attachment of an unrelated debt owed to the defendant. In determining the situs of the
debt, the Court designated that it traveled with the debtor.
111. Harris therefore exemplified the fictitious nature of quasi-in-rem procedures generally. See Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?49 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 668 (1975).
112. See note 108 supra.
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the requisite "minimum contacts" to assert in-personam jurisdiction."3 For example, the alien may own treasury bills in an account
in a New York bank. Assume that the property is unrelated to the
cause of action. If it is determined that the Iranian government has
blocked all American access to Iranian courts, the case for the application of "jurisdiction by necessity""' emerges as a solution.
When the plaintiff is faced with bringing an action in his domicile, where the alien has placed property, or forfeiting his cause of
action, it would appear consistent with the rationale of Shaffer to
permit the New York Court to exercise jurisdiction. The direct effect
of Shaffer was to send the plaintiff to another state, not to totally
preclude the plaintiff from obtaining any relief. Shaffer acknowledged that unrelated property may be attached as security for a
judgment rendered in another state."' This itself assumes the existence of another forum. Further, Shaffer expressly reserved judgment
on the question whether property may suffice as a basis of jurisdiction when "no other forum is available to the plaintiff.""' While
Shaffer concentrates on the defendant's due process, the plaintiff
also has due process rights which provide him a right to a forum." 7
Accordingly, when this right is totally foreclosed by the usual
"minimum contacts" test, and by conditions existing in the alien's
domicile, the plaintiff should be permitted a forum "by necessity"
in the state of his residence. "8
It is questionable whether jurisdiction by necessity should be exercised anywhere but the plaintiffs domicile. The plaintiff's state
would appear to have sufficient interest in providing its citizens a
113. Actually jurisdiction could still be exercised under an "effects" statute, but these are
not prevalent in most states for commercial causes of action. See notes 141-43 infra and
accompanying text.
114. The concept of "jurisdiction by necessity" is not new. See notes 133-35 infra and
accompanying text.
115. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
116. "This case does not raise, and we therefore do not consider the question whether the
presence of a defendant's property in a State is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other
forum is available to the plaintiff." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977).
117. According to Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), a state may by statute create a
property right so that the deprivation of the entitlement may constitute a denial of due
process. If a state statute confers a cause of action for a wrong but denies all access to any
courts, the argument may be made that denial of a forum to adjudicate the cause of action
is tantamount to a deprivation of the cause of action.
118. In alluding to the "minimum contacts" test, the Shaffer Court said, "We believe...
that the fairness standard of InternationalShoe can be easily applied in the vast majority of
cases." 433 U.S. 186, at 211. It may be argued that the Court admitted that in some instances
in which the minimum contacts standard could not apply, a substitute standard would be
permissible of necessity. See also Hazard, supra note 11, at 255 n.45.
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court in which to sue." 9 This state interest should provide the
"compensatory" contacts to justify jurisdiction when "minimum
contacts" and another forum are otherwise non-existent.
If the plaintiff were a resident of Oregon and the treasury bills
were in New York, a problem emerges in determining which state
should be the "necessity" forum. An apparent solution would be to
maintain the action in Oregon, and to attach the New York property
as security for a judgment rendered in the Oregon forum. This
procedure may be preferable because the "contacts" of the plaintiff's home state and its interest in providing a forum for its residents is presumably greater than the interest of a state in which an
alien defendant's unrelated property lies.1 0 Arguably, the defendant
has more purposefully linked himself to New York, where he chose
to place property, than to Oregon where he has no ties.' 2 Yet, ultimately Oregon should be the prevailing forum since jurisdiction by
necessity is a remedial
measure, and not an expression of
"minimum contacts.' ' 22
3.

Gross Unfairness to the Plaintiff

If the alien defendant lacks the requisite "minimum contacts"
with any state, under existing long-arm statutes the plaintiff's
"choice" may be to either bring the action in a foreign country or
not at all. Such a restriction on the plaintiff may often result in gross
unfairness to him. Further, the "jurisdiction by necessity" alternative does not directly 23 apply because here the plaintiff does have a
119. "[I]n a modern independent political regime the lawgiving and law enforcing agencies of that regime, and not of some other, regulate the affairs of persons and property in the
territory ruled by that regime." Hazard, supra note 11, at 264.
120. This conclusion is based on the quality and permanence of contacts. A plaintiffs
domicile is the state with which he intends to remain permanently. See notes 14-17 supra.
Unrelated property, on the other hand, need not even be tangible. However, the property
could also be of a permanent nature such as real estate. The case for the state in which the
property lies becomes stronger as the permanent connection of the property to the forum
increases. See generally Smit, supra note 64 and accompanying text.
121. Arguably, this purposeful link by a voluntary act of the defendant is probably why
Shaffer suggested that the state where unrelated property lies, as opposed to the plaintiffs
domicile, may suggest a sufficient contact, in some instances.
122. Shaffer rejected fictions and the use of form over substance. See notes 39-41, 45-50
supra and accompanying text. Thus, the necessary result must not be made to fit into a
"minimum contacts" niche, if the very need for the remedy arises because the "minimum
contacts" standard cannot feasibly be applied in that instance. A similar example of making
the base "fit" the traditional assertion can be found in the first days of the motor vehicle
statutes. See Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). Initially the non-resident driver was
said to have "consented" to the state's jurisdiction. This rationale has now been discarded.
See Currie, supra note 12.
123. It could be argued that the jurisdiction by necessity principle -indirectly applies
because at some point the hardships to the plaintiff may leave him no choice but to abandon
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forum. Arguably the plaintiff has no guaranteed right to sue in the
United States, if he has a forum in another country.'24 This argument is especially persuasive if the plaintiff does extensive business
in the alien-defendant's country, and deals with the alien wholly
outside the United States. Requiring such a plaintiff to sue in the
alien's country may even be considered an inevitable cost of doing
business abroad.' = However, the facts of each case should be considered to determine whether or not the plaintiff has the actual jurisdictional "choice" of suing in another country.'26
Factors to be considered in this analysis are the resources available to the plaintiff and to the defendant, 127 the degree of involvement of each party with the other's country,' and the practical
hardships in forcing each party to respond in the other's country. "
For example, if an alien-corporate defendant owns five million
his cause of action. Thus, the "alternative" forum in the foreign country is no more available
to this plaintiff than the Iranian forum which was tutally foreclosed to the plaintiff in the
prior example. See notes 111-120 supra and accompanying text. Such an indirect "jurisdiction
by necessity" argument was attempted in Omni Aircraft Sales, Inc., v. Actividades Aereas
Aragonesos, S.A., No. 77-4012 (9th Cir. filed Dec. 27, 1977). However, the plaintiff had
already instituted suits against the Spanish defendants in both Washington, D.C. per a
contractual consent-to-jurisdiction provision, and in Geneva, Switzerland. Furthermore, the
plaintiff's domicile was in Delaware and its principal place of business in Washington, D.C.
Thus, there is not a convincing case for jurisdiction by necessity when the plaintiff' himself
contractually agreed to litigate in Washington, and the Court so held. Professor Friedenthal
also has raised the question of the propriety of considering a forum in a foreign country as
equivalent to "no other forum." Friedenthal, A Comment on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner
in the Classroom, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 319, at 323. Indeed, Friedenthal's point bears merit if
every alternative foreign forum were considered as "no forum" per se. However, it would
appear that Shaffer, in rejecting rote and unsubstantiated jurisdictional assertions, would
permit an inquiry into the conditions surrounding the alternative forum to determine what,
in substance, the effect of sending the plaintiff to the other country would be.
124. This would be supported by the general rule that each individual is not guaranteed
the "best" due process, but rather the extent of the process that is due is determined by the
nature of the property right. There may only be a denial of due process when that process
which should be accorded, under those circumstances, is denied. See Board of Curators v.
Horowitz, __ U.S. __ , 98 S.Ct. 948 (1978).
125. Indeed, the courts have held, similarly, that an alien defendant subjects itself to risk
of suit in the United States by doing business here and that this may be allocated as a
business expense. See Survey, supra note 89, at 373. See also Thornton v. Toyota Motor Sales
U.S.A., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1975). There is no apparent reason, therefore, why
this logic may not apply to the American plaintiff doing business abroad.
126. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
127. Indeed, these are the factors suggested to be considered in any assertion under
InternationalShoe. See Developments, supra note 20; see also Note, Civil Procedure-Long
Arm Statutes-JurisdictionOver Alien Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 18
WAYNE L. Rav. 1585, 1595 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Long Arm Statutes].
128. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14; Long Arm Statutes, supra note 125, at
1595.
129. Cf., Smit, supra note 64 (suggesting that the balancing of these factors is required
before quasi-in-rem, as opposed to in-personam jurisdiction may be exercised).
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dollars worth of farmland in Illinois, this property should be considered as one of the involvements of the defendant with that state. 30
Assuming a New York resident is injured in France, and his only
"choice" is litigating in France, economic realities may force the
plaintiff to abandon his cause of action. The question arises whether
Illinois could serve as an alternative jurisdiction. The conditions
ordinarily contemporaneous with the ownership of land, may suggest that Illinois is an alternative forum. 3 ' First, the degree of the
plaintiff's involvements with France should be considered. If the
plaintiff was injured during a temporary, personal trip and does not
have continuous connection with France, his involvement is minimal. Certainly he has not chosen to project himself into France's
commercial stream. The defendant, on the other hand, has projected himself into the commercial stream of Illinois through investing in land, one of the state's most valued commodities. In addition,
such an investment could be coupled with the existence of other
contacts with commerce in Illinois. Where the hardship and inconvenience to the plaintiff so grossly outweighs the hardship and inconvenience to the defendant, it is possible that the "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" would not be offended
32
if the defendant is required to submit to jurisdiction in Illinois.
The general principles of the Shaffer decision support such a result, and permit purposefully-owned property to support jurisdiction when to hold otherwise would result in gross unfairness to the
plaintiff. '33Shaffer placed substance over form and examined practicalities. Further, since Shaffer emphasized the requirement that
the defendant have "purposeful" contacts with the forum state, it
is consistent to hold, that if a jurisdictional dispute is between a
state and a foreign country as opposed to a state and another state,
the due process analysis should weigh the hardships to the parties
and consider the degree of involvements of each to the other's country. 34 When the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the
130. Both Smit, supra note 64, and Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in Shaffer
suggest that the ownership of land is a sufficient involvement with a forum. Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977).
131. Contemporaneous with the ownership of land is usually the availability of American
lawyers in the alien's employ.
132. This conclusion would be supported by the significance of owning land, and the state
interest in regulating land ownership and by a practical analysis of the factual realities, as
opposed to rote formulae for jurisdictional assertions. See Agricultural Foreign Investment
Disclosure Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, 92 Stat. 1263.
133. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
134. This is because if the dispute involves two or more states the federalism aspect of
state adjudicatory power comes into play to require "minimum contacts" for extraterritorial
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benefits of owning significant property in the forum, that property
may constitute a sufficient basis for exercising jurisdiction especially when to hold otherwise would submit the plaintiff to gross
unfairness.
Several courts have considered the practical hardships to the
plaintiff if he is forced to go to another country as a result of a denial
of jurisdiction in a state forum,3 5 but few courts have explicitly
acknowledged the actual weight that this consideration has played
in upholding jurisdiction in an American court. 31 Instead, the courts
have attempted to "fit" the alien character into a conventional
jurisdictional base. 37 Following the methodology of Shaffer, the possible hardship to an American plaintiff may occasionally require
that unrelated property, purposefully situated in a state, serve as a
basis of jurisdiction.
CAUSING AN "EFFECT" IN THE FORUM

Contracts and business obligations often arise from communications by mail 38 and telephone, 3 particularly when the parties are
assertions. See notes 31, 32, 50, 98 supra and accompanying text. When the dispute lacks the
federalism component, all of the circumstances should be considered in the analysis so that
the "fair" result is reached by fact and not fiction.
135. In a case of first impression whether the Washington long-arm statute should apply
to aliens the court concluded: "With the breakdown in international commercial barriers, and
the resulting fact that a substantial portion of goods sold to American consumers today is
manufactured in foreign lands, we would be striking a serious blow at consumer protection if
we did not recognize such jurisdiction. We cannot expect consumers in this state to travel to
• . .other parts of the world to litigate . . . fairness to the foreign manufacturer does not
require that hardship to local consumers." (emphasis added) Omstead v. Brader Heaters,
Inc., 5 Wash. App. 258, 487 P.2d 234, 242-43 (1971); see also Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk A.G.
of Wolfburg, 29 N.Y. 2d 426, 328 N.Y.S. 2d 653, 278 N.E.2d 895 (1972); Van Eeuwen v.
Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 124 N.J. Super. 251, 306 A.2d 79 (App. Div. 1973).
136. See generally Survey, supra note 89.
137. The court found that the alien defendant was "doing business" through its subsidiary, when actually the facts revealed that the defendant was not substantially "present" in
the forum. The court instead noted the hardships that would befall the plaintiff to litigate
in another country and concluded that jurisdiction existed. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v.
Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969); Omstead v. Brader Heaters, Inc., 5 Wash. App.
258, 487 P. 2d 234, 242-43 (1971). Actually, jurisdiction could have been properly asserted
tinder an "effects" approach. See notes 136-52 infra and accompanying text.
138. In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the Court upheld
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant whose only contact with the forum was the mailing
of insurance premiums into the state. McGee has been cited for the proposition that physical
presence in the forum is unnecessary when defendant solicits business there nonetheless and
when he has caused an "effect" in the state from which the cause of action arises.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 37, Comment a (1971); CALIF. CODE CIv. PROC. §
410.10 comment 9 (1970 West). See Forsythe v. Overmeyer, 576 F.2d 779 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S..Ct. 188 (1978).
139. Although a telephone call has been held to be a business act in the forum, most courts
hold that this act alone is not a sufficiently purposeful availment to sustain in-personam
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countries apart. It is therefore possible for an alien-defendant to

cause the American plaintiff serious economic injury, without sending an agent into the forum. As a result, an alien corporation may
bring about certain consequences while escaping jurisdiction in the
forum.' 4
Typically, state long-arm statutes require that the defendant perform some physical activity in the forum. However, an "effect"
caused in a state may be considered a significant element of the
"transaction of business" if it is a foreseeable and natural consequence of the defendant's acts relative to that transaction."' Some
states construe its transaction of business statutes to include such
instances in which the defendant causes an effect in the forum from
which the cause of action arises. 42'
Most states have enacted long-arm statutes which authorize jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who causes a tortious effect
in the state.'4 3 It has been suggested that the scope of "effects"
statutes be extended to include defendants who cause a direct effect
in a state in which they engage in commercial activities and derive
commercial benefits. '44
jurisdiction. Aaron v. Ferer & Sons Co. v. American Compressed Steel Co., 564 F. 2d 1206
(8th Cir. 1977); but see Empire Abrasive Equipment v. H. H. Watson, Inc., 567 F. 2d 554
(3rd Cir. 1977) (a single phone call soliciting business which would induce Plaintiff to in turn
solicit others to fulfill agreement with Defendant may be sufficient contacts to sustain inpersonam jurisdiction); Currie, supra note 12, at 569-70; Forsythe v. Overmeyer, 576 F.2d 779
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 188 (1978).
140. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) is often cited
for the proposition that increasing international interactions necessitate the expansion of
bases of jurisdiction to reach the distant alien. The McGee Court stated, "Today many
commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the
full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase
in the amount of business conducted by mail across the state lines. . . It is sufficient for
purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State." Other courts have dealt with the problem by reasoning that if Defendant benefits from commercial activity involving the State, he should be responsible there.
See Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 107 (1898); Hicks v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 452
F. Supp. 131, 134 (M.D. Penn. 1978) ("Any other result would permit a foreign corporation
to market its product in this state, profit from its sale here and yet retain immunity simply
by structuring its business opportunities so as to avoid direct activity in the [forum].").
141. Texas has not enacted a separate "effects" statute, but has interpreted its general
long-arm statute to include acts outside the forum which cause either a tortious or commercial effect in the forum. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 47 U.S.L.W. 4844 (June 26, 1979) (No. 78-759); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
142. Supra note 139.
143. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(b) (1977). See also Currie, supra note 12.
Most statutes are limited to products liability causes of action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS, §37, Comment a (1971).
144. Currie, supra note 12; Developments, supra note 20, at 928.
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Such an "effects" statute exists in California'45 and provides that
this jurisdiction may be exercised only when fair and reasonable.
Most recently, the Supreme Court in Kulko v. Superior Court of
California'" decided that in the absence of a showing that nonresident, defendant-father either caused physical injury or engaged
in commercialactivity in California, in-personamjurisdiction could
not be exercised under that statute. This holding indicates that the
Supreme Court would affirm jurisdictional assertions under
"effects" statutes when the defendant causes an effect in the forum
as a result of engaging in commercial activity there.
Effects statutes would also provide a means of asserting jurisdiction over alien-defendants who are unreachable under present
"doing business" statutes.'47 Under the "doing business" basis an
American subsidiary may render its alien parent "present" in the
forum if it can be shown that the subsidiary is a "mere department"
or an "agent" of the parent.'48 For example, if the alien parent
breaches a contract for the sale of cars to be shipped from Italy, a
Missouri plaintiff may bring the action in New York, where the
subsidiary does business selling bolts, if it can be shown that the
parent controls the subsidiary.'48 If, however, the alien successfully
shows that the subsidiary is an independent entity, jurisdiction
could not be exercised over the alien-parent in New York.5 0 Notwithstanding, if the subsidiary sells cars and in fact it can be shown
that the alien's products were sent to the subsidiary, then it is the
outlet through which the alien causes the injury. 5' Under the effects
approach New York would be a proper forum for a cause of action
145. See CALIF. CODE CIV. PROC. §410.10, Comment 9 (1970 West); see also Forsythe v.
Overmeyer, 576 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 188 (1978); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974); Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,
577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 47 U.S.L.W. 4844 (June 26, 1979) (No.
78-759). In Great Western the Court reversed on grounds of venue obviating any need to
consider the jurisdictional question. Indeed, the Court admitted that the jurisdictional
question is ordinarily considered before the venue question. Nevertheless, the Court labelled
the jurisdictional assertion, based on "effects", a "novel constitutional question" (47
U.S.L.W. at 4846) and decided to consider the venue question first.
146. Kulko v. Supreme Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, reh. denied, 436 U.S. 908 (1978).
The Court also found that Defendant-father did not "purposefully avail" himself of acting
in the forum that would invoke benefits from the state. Id. at 1698-99. The action was for
breach of an agreement to provide child support. The Court analyzed the "effects" statute
and did not intimate criticism of the legislation. Rather, the Court found, in "personal,
domestic" relations, application of the "effects" statute was "misplaced." Id. at 96, 97.
147. Comment, PersonalJurisdictionOver A lien CorporateParentsand Affiliates in Antitrust Actions: A Plea for Perspicuity, 5 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & CoM. 149, 196-206 (1977)
(hereinafter cited as Jurisdiction).
148. Supra note 15 and accompanying text.
149. Supra note 15 and accompanying text.
150. Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1964).
151. Jurisdiction, supra note 145, at 196-206.
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related to that injury. 5 ' The alien-parent has benefited from commercial involvement in New York and has caused a direct commercial injury there.
The "effects" approach is consistent with the requirements of
Shaffer because the effect must be a consequence of "purposeful"
commercial activity, and the cause of action must arise from the
commercial injury in the forum. 5 ' Further, the requisite relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the cause of action
exists. 54
CONSENT

To

JURISDICTION

OR

ARBITRATION

A common means of obtaining jurisdiction over an alien corporation is by obtaining that corporation's consent to jurisdiction in a
particular forum. Perhaps the greatest assurance of due process
exists when the parties have mutually "consented" to jurisdiction
or arbitration in a particular forum.' 55 Many of the disputes above
would be eliminated if all international sales agreements provided
for such "consent" clauses.' The reasoning inherent in the
"consent" basis of jurisdiction is that a defendant may not object
to defending in a forum to which he has knowingly consented.'57 The
only remaining barriers to effective jurisdiction are similar to the
ordinary contractual enforceability issues of equal bargaining
power, cohesion and public policy.'58 There are strong policy considerations favoring the recognition of such voluntary agreements, especially in the context of international disputes, and the courts
should defer to them whenever possible. 5 '
CONCLUSION

The due process standards for in-personamjurisdiction are evolving towards the requirement that in all instances the defendant
have some meaninful connection to the forum. Shaffer aided in this
evolutionary process by rejecting the validity of jurisdiction based
152. Jurisdiction, supra note 145.
153. See notes 139-43 supra and accompanying text.
154. See notes 7, 27 supra and accompanying text.
155. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish
American Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806, 807 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
156. P.O. Proehl, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 294 (1959).
157. See note 16 supra.
158. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427
(1953); U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
159. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972); Wm. H. Muller & Co. v.
Swedish American Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903
(1955).
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on fictions, and by affirming the standards of "minimum contacts"
for extraterritorial assertions. The standard for jurisdiction should
be uniformly applied to domestic and alien defendants. However,
that standard must be flexible enough to include a consideration of
the unique circumstances surrounding litigation involving an alien
defendant.
Alien-owned property, significantly situated in a state, may constitutionally be attached as security for a judgment to be rendered
in another forum, if a state statute authorizes the attachment. The
remedial alternative of "jurisdiction by necessity" should be acknowledged to enable a plaintiff to bring an action in his domicile
when no other forum is available. In addition, when the plaintiff's
jurisdictional "choice" is to bring suit in another country, the hardships and inconveniences to each party and the degree of involvement between each party and their adversary's domicile should be
weighed. If the balancing reveals that requiring the plaintiff to litigate in another country would result in gross unfairness, the existence of unrelated, alien-owned property in the state may suggest a
sufficiently meaningful connection to justify jurisdiction, under the
circumstances.
The jurisdictional basis of "doing business" should retain its traditional distinctiveness from extraterritorial jurisdiction. To insure
that "doing business" basis retains its territorial nature, the standards should be more strictly applied to require extensive and continuous activity in the forum. When an alien defendant is not
"doing business" in the forum, jurisdiction may be exercised under
an "effects" statute. State legislatures should consider the desirability of enacting effects statutes to authorize extraterritorial assertions over the defendant who benefits from commercial activity in
the forum causing an "effect" from which the cause of action arises.
These means of obtaining jurisdiction are consistent with the rationale of Shaffer. Use of such jurisdictional tools should maximize
the plaintiff's ability to reach the corporate alien-defendant, while
insuring protection of the defendant's due process rights.
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